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The Death Penalty and the Society We Want∗
STEPHEN B. BRIGHT∗∗
Winston Churchill once observed: “The mood and temper of the public
in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country. . . . [They] mark and measure the stored-up
strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof of the living virtue within
it.” It is worth a moment to examine how our society measures up by this
standard and to look at the role that lawyers play in shaping the kind of
society we have.
At the local level, we can tell a lot about a community by how it treats
a homeless person suffering from schizophrenia who is begging on the
street. One possibility is to look upon that person with the thought that
there but for grace go I, that this person is desperately in need of help, and
that we—individually and as a community—must respond by giving a
helping hand and making sure that the person receives food, shelter, clothing, and care for such a debilitating mental illness. Another possibility is
to simply ignore the person, to step around him or her on the way to buying
a five-dollar cup of coffee, asking one’s self only: “Why should I help this
person? Why should I give any money? Why should I do anything at all?”
Another approach—the predominant view in many communities today—is
to ask, why isn’t that person in jail? Why hasn’t the person been arrested
for violating one of the “quality of life crimes” which many communities
have adopted to protect the quality of life of those better off at the expense
of those who are worse off? They have accomplished this by criminalizing
behavior such as jaywalking, loitering, panhandling, and other conduct that
makes it possible for the police to arrest almost anyone to clear the street of
people we do not want to see. This is the “broken windows” approach to
policing that Rudolph Guiliani used in New York. It uses the criminal law
to clear the streets of the homeless, the mentally ill, and other “undesirables.” So there are three possible approaches: compassion, indifference,
and hostility. The one adopted by a community tells us a lot about it.
Of course, there are different approaches to crime and criminals that
are adopted at a much higher level of government. We might ask, does a
society torture those it believes guilty of crimes? There is a fairly clear
∗ The Frank Rowe Kenison Lecture, Franklin Pierce Law Center, April 9, 2007.
∗∗ President and Senior Counsel, Southern Center for Human Rights, Atlanta, Georgia; J. Skelly
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line between societies that torture people and those that do not torture. The
Bush Administration tried to fudge it by adopting a definition for torture
that did not include what the rest of the world understands to be torture.1
But it did not work. Other nations and people throughout the world look
upon the United States differently today because of its resort to torture than
they did before. Unfortunately, when many people around the world think
of the United States, they now think of holding people for years without
trials at Guantanamo instead of the values symbolized by the Statue of
Liberty.
We may also ask, does a society kill? Does it have capital punishment? Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said that the death penalty was society’s
final statement that it would not forgive. Supreme Court Justice Arthur
Goldberg said that the deliberate institutionalized taking of life by the state
was the greatest possible degradation of a human being. A society that
responds to crime with capital punishment is an unforgiving society. Its
use of such a degrading punishment says something about its commitment—or lack of commitment—to human dignity. It also reflects either
arrogance on the part of the society—based on a belief that its institutions
are infallible—or indifference—a belief that the people affected by its decisions to kill are of so little worth that it does not matter if they are mistakenly executed.
The point with both the death penalty and torture is not whether there
are people who may deserve to be tortured or put to death, but whether the
society is willing to engage in such practices. They are not only degrading
to the person who is tortured or executed, they are also degrading to the
society that tortures or executes. These practices coarsen the society and
the people in it. Four countries—Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United
States—account for ninety-one percent of the executions in the world today.2 The company one keeps also says a lot about a society.
If a society retains the primitive punishment of putting people to death,
despite the availability of more recently developed methods of punishment,
such as imprisonment in secure facilities, it should be committed to having
a legal system that is capable to the extent humanly possible of ensuring
the accuracy and the reliability of decisions that result in imposition of the
death penalty. At a minimum, it should do everything it can to prevent
conviction of the innocent, the influence of racial bias, and the arbitrary
and uneven imposition of the death penalty.
1. See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR
34–37 (2007).
2. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/c3d650aa-a2a8-11dc-8d74-6f45f39984e5/act500022
007en.pdf.
ON TERROR
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We have today indisputable evidence of the fallibility of our legal system. DNA comparisons have established beyond doubt that many people
convicted of crimes—including some sentenced to death—were completely innocent.3 Unfortunately, we do not know how many people were
wrongfully convicted in cases where there was no biological evidence
available for comparison or, if there was such evidence, it was not preserved.
The DNA exonerations are a powerful reminder that police, prosecutors, judges, and juries make mistakes with regard to the most basic issue
the legal system is responsible for deciding—guilt and innocence. Many
public officials responsible for the criminal justice system—and many
members of our society—would prefer not to think about that, but now it is
undeniable. We have seen people who have lost years of their lives because of wrongful convictions and perpetrators of crimes who have remained at large because someone else was convicted of the crimes they
committed.
It is impossible to eliminate the risk of error, but it can be minimized
by such things as improving techniques for eyewitness identification, preventing interrogation practices that may produce false confessions, improving practices and oversight in crime laboratories, and assuring that those
accused of crimes are capably represented.4 A commission appointed by
Governor George Ryan in Illinois following the exonerations of thirteen
people sentenced to death in that state made comprehensive recommendations for reducing error in capital cases,5 and the American Bar Association
has established standards for the performance of counsel in capital cases.6
But many jurisdictions have not implemented these measures because of
cost, resistance to change, or indifference.
The most fundamental element of fairness in an adversary system of
justice is representation of the accused by competent counsel. Our legal
system is so complex and contains so many procedural traps that a lay per3. See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 262–67 (2000).
4. See generally id.; The Innocence Project, Fix the System: Priority Issues, http://www.innocence
project.org/fix/Priority-Issues.php (last visited Dec. 21, 2007).
5. See COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_
report/summary_recommendations.pdf.
6. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 989 (rev. ed. 2003), available at
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/confer_aba_DPGuidelines.pdf. The guidelines are not binding on lawyers
defending capital cases, but they have been cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in finding
that representation violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.
374, 387, 387 n.7 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards
and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . . .”).
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son accused of a crime can no more navigate it alone than a passenger can
fly a plane in the absence of the pilot. Those accused of crimes rely upon
lawyers to protect all of their legal rights, investigate thoroughly the facts,
test the prosecution’s case against them through cross-examination of witnesses and other means, produce evidence that casts doubt upon guilt, and,
for those found guilty, present evidence to be considered in mitigation with
regard to punishment.
Such representation must be provided to both rich and poor for, as Justice Hugo Black stated for the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois,7
“[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has.”8 However, as we all know, in our country today, the kind of justice people get depends very much upon how
much money they have. The kind of equal justice described by Justice
Black has been an aspiration of our legal system—Justice William Brennan
described the Bill of Rights as a “lodestar for our aspirations”9—but it is
questionable how vigorously it is being pursued today despite such draconian punishments as death, life imprisonment without parole, and long
prison terms.
Although a person accused of a crime must be provided a lawyer at
trial,10 many states still lack comprehensive and adequate indigent defense
systems.11 Even in capital cases, the representation provided in many jurisdictions is simply a disgrace to the legal profession and the criminal
justice system. There have been capital cases in which the lawyers appointed to represent the defendant have failed to investigate the facts of the
crime or the backgrounds of their clients but have still been found to be
sufficient counsel for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.12 Death sentences have even been imposed and upheld in cases in which the defense
lawyers were asleep, intoxicated, or under the influence of drugs.13

7. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
8. Id. at 19.
9. See Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., To the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University, October 12, 1985, in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1986).
10. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 37–38 (1972).
11. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Kenneth Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant’s Right to Competent Counsel: It’s
Time for Some Standards!, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 129, 140–141 (2005); see also Stephen Henderson,
Defense Often Inadequate in Four Death-Penalty States, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, Jan. 16, 2007
(part one in a series of five articles regarding the poor quality of legal representation found in a study of
eighty death penalty cases from Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia).
13. See Jeffrey L. Kirshmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 455–60 (1996)
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A defendant relies upon counsel to protect all other rights, but a defendant is powerless to obtain a competent lawyer in the first place. Poor
people accused of crimes are assigned lawyers. They are often dependent
on the luck of the draw with regard to the competency of the lawyers they
get. This is illustrated by the plight of an African American man, Gregory
Wilson, who faced the death penalty in Covington, Kentucky. The judge
presiding over the case had difficulty finding a lawyer for Wilson because
a Kentucky statute limited compensation for defense counsel in capital
cases to $2500. When the head of the local indigent defense program suggested to the judge that more compensation was necessary to obtain a lawyer qualified for such a serious case, the judge suggested that the indigent
defense program rent a river boat and sponsor a cruise down the Ohio
River to raise money for the defense.
The judge eventually obtained counsel by posting a notice in the courthouse asking any member of the bar to take the case with the plea,
“PLEASE HELP. DESPERATE.” The notice said nothing about qualifications to handle a capital case. The judge appointed two lawyers who
responded.
This method of selecting counsel did not produce a “dream team.” The
lead counsel can charitably be described as well past his prime. The lawyer did not have an office, but practiced out of his home, where a Budweiser beer sign was prominently displayed. The police had recently pried
up the boards in his living room floor and recovered stolen property. The
telephone number he gave Wilson was for a bar called “Kelly’s Keg.” The
other lawyer, who had volunteered to assist lead counsel, had no felony
trial experience.
Wilson, realizing that the lawyers were not up to the task of defending
a capital murder case, repeatedly objected to being represented by the lawyers.14 He repeatedly asked the judge that he be provided with a lawyer
who was capable of defending a capital case.15 The judge refused and proceeded to conduct a trial that was a travesty of justice. Lead counsel was
not even present for some of the trial. He cross-examined only a few witnesses, including one witness whose direct testimony he missed because he
was out of the courtroom. Wilson was sentenced to death.
(citing cases in which convictions were upheld even though defense lawyers were intoxicated, abusing
drugs, or mentally ill).
14. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 872, 878 (Ky. 1992) (noting that “[a]t many points
during the trial, Wilson repeated his assertion that his court-appointed standby counsel were, to use
Wilson’s words, ‘unprepared, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and lacked the necessary competence and experience’”); see also Wilson v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 901, 902–04 (Ky. 1998).
15. See Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 883 (quoting transcript in which Wilson asks for “competent counsel”); id. at 884 (noting Wilson’s “insistence that the court appoint him an attorney who met Wilson’s
specifications as a death penalty expert”).
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What more could Gregory Wilson do to enforce his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel? He objected. He complained about the lawyers appointed by the judge, who were clearly incapable of defending him. He
asked for a real lawyer. But these efforts were insufficient to enforce the
right to counsel.
Most of those accused of crimes who receive inadequate representation
do not realize the incompetence of the lawyer appointed to defend them.
But even if they do, they face a Hobson’s choice. If they complain, they
run the risk that the quality of the representation will deteriorate even further because they will offend their lawyer, but the judge will not replace
them. Or there is the equally valid fear that the next lawyer appointed by
the same judge may be even worse. Unless a state has a public defender
system with a great deal of integrity, defendants may end up like Gregory
Wilson.
In theory, the right to counsel can be vindicated after trial if the defendant can establish that the representation at trial amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel.16 The Catch-22 for most poor people, however, is
that they need another lawyer—and a capable one—to establish in postconviction proceedings the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, but the Supreme Court has held that they have no right to a lawyer at that stage of the
process.17 Even if the state provides a lawyer to raise a claim of ineffectiveness as some do, there is no guarantee that the new lawyer will be any
more competent than trial counsel. In Texas, for example, a person facing
the death penalty may have equally bad lawyers at trial and in postconviction proceedings.
The capital of capital punishment is Houston, Harris County, Texas.
More people sentenced to death in Harris County have been executed than
from any state except Texas itself.18 The Houston Chronicle described the
trial of George McFarland in Houston as follows:
16. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a two part test for determining whether an accused received ineffective assistance: (1) whether the performance of counsel was
deficient and, if so, (2) whether there is a substantial probability that the representation affected the
outcome). Thus, even when a defendant receives deficient representation, the conviction and sentence
may be upheld based upon a reviewing court’s conclusion that it did not matter all that much. See also
William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the
Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995).
17. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57
(1987).
18. See TEXAS COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, TEXAS DEATH PENALTY
DEVELOPMENTS IN 2007: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2007), available at http://www.tcadp.org/uploads/
File/2007annualreport.pdf (reporting that at the end of 2007, 102 people sentenced to death in Harris
County had been executed, more than any state except Texas as a whole). Only five states executed
over fifty people between the resumption of capital punishment in 1976 and the end of 2007: Texas
(408), Virginia (98), Oklahoma (86), Missouri (66), and Florida (64). DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
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Seated beside his client . . . defense attorney John Benn spent
much of Thursday afternoon’s trial in . . . deep sleep. His mouth
kept falling open and his head lolled back on his shoulders, and
then he awakened just long enough to catch himself and sit upright. Then it happened again. And again. And again.
Every time he opened his eyes, a different prosecution witness
was on the stand describing another aspect of the Nov. 19, 1991,
arrest of George McFarland in the robbery-killing of grocer Kenneth Kwan.
....
Court observers said Benn seems to have slept his way through
virtually the entire trial.19
When the judge finally called a recess, the lawyer was asked how he could
be sleeping while supposedly defending a capital murder case. He replied,
“It’s boring.”20 The more important question was asked of the judge: how
could he preside over a capital case in which the lawyer was sleeping? He
answered that the Constitution guarantees a right to a lawyer, but it does
not guarantee that the lawyer must be awake.21 This judge was a true strict
constructionalist.
Three people in Houston—George McFarland, Calvin Burdine, and
Carl Johnson—were represented by lawyers who slept during their capital
trials while supposedly defending them. The entire United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, struggled with the question of
whether Burdine’s right to counsel was violated because his lawyer, Joe
Frank Cannon, whose file was less than three pages of notes, slept during
parts of the two-day trial in which Burdine was convicted and condemned
to death.
It is an embarrassment to the legal profession that lawyers were arguing to an en banc court about whether the Constitution was violated by a
defense attorney sleeping while supposedly defending a person in a capital
trial. But the judges wanted to know whether Cannon slept through any
important parts of the very short trial. There was no way to know since
Cannon did not make a record as to when he was asleep and when he was
awake. One judge asked if there was a difference between a lawyer who
CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2008), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/FactSheet.pdf.
19. John Makeig, Asleep on the Job? Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Says, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug.
14, 1992, at A35.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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slept and one who was under the influence of alcohol or drugs or suffering
from a mental illness. It was an important question because, as a panel of
the court had noted in upholding Burdine’s conviction and death sentence,
courts have found that lawyers were not ineffective even though they had
been impaired by alcohol, drug use, or mental illness.22 To distinguish that
precedent, it was pointed out that a lawyer who was under the influence of
alcohol, drugs, or mental illness would at least be conscious, although impaired. If a lawyer is sleeping, on the other hand, he or she is unconscious.
A lawyer who has slept during parts of the trial cannot argue to the jury in
closing that it did not hear any witness say a certain thing, as lawyers often
do, because the lawyer may not know whether any witnesses testified that
way or not.
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, ultimately decided, by a vote of nine
to five, that Burdine’s right to counsel was violated and he was entitled to a
new trial,23 but not without a very bitter dissent by Judge Barksdale.24
Most people caught sleeping on the job in any line of work are fired,
but Houston judges continued to appoint Cannon to capital and other
criminal cases. Cannon also slept during the capital trial of Carl Johnson.
A law professor who later represented Johnson found in reading the trial
transcript that Cannon’s “ineptitude . . . jumps off the printed page.”25
Nevertheless, the death sentence was upheld by the Texas and federal
courts. Johnson was executed by Texas in 1996.26
These cases give a new meaning to being represented by the “dream
team.” Of course, most lawyers do not sleep during trial. But all too often,
lawyers appointed to defend poor people facing the death penalty fail to
investigate, do not know the law, or are at best mediocre in their representation.27 But Johnson’s execution and the bitter division of a federal court
of appeals over whether sleeping during a capital trial violates the Constitution demonstrates how little regard the courts have for the quality of representation provided to poor people facing the death penalty. One federal
judge, in reluctantly upholding a death sentence, observed that, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitution “does not require that

22. See Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 959 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated and rev’d en banc, 262 F.3d
336 (5th Cir. 2001). The panel decided, by a two-to-one vote, to uphold Burdine’s conviction and
sentence.
23. Burdine, 262 F.3d at 338.
24. See id. at 357 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
25. David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694–95
(1996).
26. Id. at 710.
27. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
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the accused, even in capital cases, be represented by able or effective counsel.”28
And those sentenced to death have no constitutional right to a lawyer
at all during critical post-conviction review of their convictions and sentences.29 This is the part of the process during which many people have
proven their innocence, established violations of their constitutional rights,
or shown that other grievous errors entitled them to new trials. People who
can afford a lawyer to represent them in these proceedings may be successful in showing a violation of their constitutional rights and may be able to
obtain a new trial. But those who cannot afford a lawyer may not be able
to seek post-conviction review and, as a result, regardless of innocence or
constitutional violations at their trial, must serve their sentences or even be
executed.
While some states provide lawyers—at least to those sentenced to
death—for post-conviction review in the state courts, most do not. People
sentenced to death in states like Alabama and Georgia may obtain representation from public interest organizations or lawyers providing pro bono
representation. But there are not enough lawyers for all of them. And poor
people who receive sentences other than death—even those sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole—have virtually no hope
of obtaining legal representation.
Exzavious Gibson, a man sentenced to death in Georgia whose IQ was
found on different tests to be between seventy-six and eighty-two, stood,
totally bewildered, in front of a judge at his first state post-conviction hearing in Georgia without a lawyer. The case proceeded as follows:
THE COURT: OK, Mr. Gibson are you ready to proceed?
MR. GIBSON: I don’t have an attorney.
THE COURT: I understand that.
MR. GIBSON: I am not waiving my rights.
THE COURT: I understand that. Do you have any evidence to put
up?
MR. GIBSON: I don’t know what to plead.
THE COURT: Huh?

28. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
29. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
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MR. GIBSON: I don’t know what to plead.30
The state of Georgia, which sought to bring about Gibson’s execution,
was represented by an assistant attorney general who specialized in capital
post-conviction cases. After the assistant attorney general presented testimony, the judge turned again to Mr. Gibson:
THE COURT: Mr. Gibson, would you like to ask [the witness] any
questions?
MR. GIBSON: I don’t have counsel.
THE COURT: I understand that, but I am asking, can you tell me
yes or no whether you want to ask him any questions or not?
MR. GIBSON: I’m not my own counsel.
THE COURT: I’m sorry, sir, I didn’t understand you.
MR. GIBSON: I’m not my own counsel.
THE COURT: I understand, but do you want . . . to ask him anything?
MR. GIBSON: I don’t know.
THE COURT: Okay, sir. Okay, thank you. [To the witness], you
can go down.31
This was a hearing which determined whether Exzavious Gibson
would be put to death. Gibson was unable to call witnesses, make objections, or cross-examine the state’s witnesses. The judge denied relief by
signing a twenty-two-page order prepared by the assistant attorney general
without changing even a comma. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
proceedings, holding that Gibson had no right to counsel.32
Other states may provide the condemned with lawyers to represent
them in post-conviction review even though they are not required to do so.
But the lawyers provided may be as bad or worse than those assigned to
defend the accused at trial. A lawyer assigned to represent an inmate sentenced to death in Texas filed the identical brief for him that he had filed
for another inmate in another case with different facts and different is30. Transcript of Hearing of Sept. 12, at 2–3, Gibson v. Turpin, No. 95-V-648 (Butts County, Ga.
Super. Ct. 1995).
31. Id.
32. Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 187 (Ga. 1999); see also Murray, 492 U.S. at 10; Barbour v.
Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1228–32 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding no right to counsel in post-conviction review). But see Jackson v. State, 732 So. 2d 187, 191 (Miss. 1999) (holding that the state is required to
appoint counsel for condemned persons in post-conviction proceedings).
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sues.33 The brief filed on behalf of another man condemned to die in
Texas, Justin Fuller, was incoherent, repetitious, and rambling, making
arguments that did not make any sense.34 The lawyer copied some of his
client’s letters into the brief. As a result, the brief contained unintelligible
and irrelevant statements such as, “I’m just about out of carbon paper so
before I run out I want to try and list everything that was added to and took
from me to convict me on the next page.”35 Nevertheless, Fuller’s appeal
was denied and he was executed.
There is no justification for a court accepting such briefs in any case.
Without adequate briefing, a court cannot do its job. A court concerned
about justice would have removed the lawyers from these cases and appointed competent lawyers so that it could decide the case based upon
briefs on the issues in the cases. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
did not slow down in these or other cases in order to get decent briefing
before denying relief and allowing executions.36
Even condemned inmates who are fortunate to receive competent representation in seeking habeas corpus review face in the federal courts what
Justice Harry Blackmun described as a “Byzantine morass of arbitrary,
unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal
rights.”37 The Writ of Habeas Corpus has been described “[o]ver the centuries” as “the common law world’s ‘freedom writ’ by whose orderly processes the production of a prisoner in court may be required and the legality
of the grounds for his incarceration inquired into, failing which the prisoner is set free.”38 The Supreme Court once said, “‘there is no higher duty
than to maintain it unimpaired, and unsuspended, save only in the cases
specified in our Constitution.’”39
However, since its decision in Wainwright v. Sykes40 in 1977, the Supreme Court has been on a “crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in
the path of any state prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional
33. See Chuck Lindell, Lawyer Makes 1 Case for 2 Killers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 26,
2006, at A1.
34. See Maro Robbins, Convict’s Odds Today May Rest on Gibberish, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Aug. 24, 2006, at A1.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Ex parte Rojas, No. 39062-01, 2003 WL 1825617, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 12,
2003) (Price, J., dissenting) (no post-conviction review because lawyer assigned to case missed statute
of limitations); Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding no right to competent
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings where lawyer appointed by the court lacked experience
and failed to raise certain claims); see also TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, LETHAL INDIFFERENCE (2002)
(describing inadequacy of lawyers assigned to provide post-conviction representation in Texas), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.asp.
37. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758–59 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712–13 (1961).
39. Id. at 713 (quoting Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939)).
40. 433 U.S. 72, 88–91 (1977).
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claims.”41 Justice John Paul Stevens said in one case that “the Court has
lost its way in a procedural maze of its own creation” and “grossly misevaluated the requirements of ‘law and justice.’”42 Congress restricted
habeas corpus review even further by enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which placed new, unprecedented restrictions on habeas corpus review,43 including a statute of limitations for filing
petitions.44
What does it say about our commitment to equal justice and the rule of
law when courts and legislatures tolerate such poor representation or even
no representation at all in cases where life and liberty are at stake? Richard
Posner, a respected judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, wrote:
I can confirm from my own experience as a judge that indigent defendants are generally rather poorly represented. But if we are to
be hardheaded we must recognize that this may not be entirely a
bad thing. The lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants seem to be good enough to reduce the probability of convicting an innocent person to a very low level. If they were much better, either many guilty people would be acquitted or society would
have to devote much greater resources to the prosecution of criminal cases. A bare-bones system for the defense of indigent criminal defendants may be optimal.45
Judge Posner writes that if public defenders were much better, some guilty
people might be acquitted; but he does not mention what is the most important result of better public defenders: some innocent people, who are
now being convicted, would also be acquitted. That is what we should be
concerned about, but it did not occur to him.
The “bare-bones system” he finds so attractive is only for poor people
in criminal cases. He does not suggest a “bare-bones system” for cases
involving wealthy people, for commercial cases, or any other kinds of
cases. That says a lot about what kind of society we have: one kind of
41. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 758–59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S.
401, 406–11 (1989); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533–36 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
130–34 (1982); see also Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant? The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997).
42. Smith, 477 U.S. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 107, 110 Stat.
1214, 1221–26.
44. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d), 2255 (2006) (establishing a one-year statute of limitations). A statute of
limitations of 180 days is provided in § 2263 for states that meet certain standards of providing counsel
in capital post-conviction proceedings.
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 163–64 (1999).
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justice for people who can afford it and another kind of justice system—a
“bare-bones system”—for people who cannot afford it. Whether we have
these two very different systems of justice is not about being tough on
crime or soft on crime, or for the death penalty or against it. It’s about
whether we have equal justice; it’s about whether we have a fair and reliable system for deciding guilt and innocence, liberty and custody, life and
death.
Those willing to settle for a “bare-bones system” or a second class system of justice for those accused of crimes suffer from, at best, a poverty of
vision with regard to what kind of justice system we should have and, at
worst, indifference to injustices that result from barely providing lawyers
to people at trial and not guaranteeing lawyers at all in post-conviction
review.
During the years of efforts to establish a public defender system in
Georgia, one thing that we heard at meetings and legislative hearings was:
“We don’t need a Cadillac, we’ll be happy with a Chevy.” When I was in
Louisiana recently at a meeting regarding the sad condition of representation for poor people accused of crimes in that state, once again I heard
people saying that Louisiana did not need a Cadillac, just a Chevy.
I do not understand why we do not want a Cadillac. This is a system
responsible for providing representation to people facing loss of their liberty or lives. Why shouldn’t we have the very best system our society can
provide? But we have set our sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity. Our commitment as a society is to something that is quite a bit less
than a full measure of justice for those accused of crimes.
The courts are failing to provide equal justice in another way as well.
Their decisions continue to be influenced by race. This is the twentieth
anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp,46 in
which the Court upheld Georgia’s capital punishment system despite pronounced racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty in that
state. The Court suggested that racial disparities may be inevitable and
held that they do not violate either the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the procedural protections of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
As a result of McCleskey and other failures to deal with the influence
of race, the criminal justice system is the part of our society which has
been least affected by the civil rights movement. There have been many
changes as a result of the civil rights movement. There are now people of
color on city councils, county commissions, in state legislatures, and in
Congress. John Lewis, who was among the civil rights marchers severely
46. 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).
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beaten by Alabama troopers when they tried to cross the Edmund Pettus
Bridge in an attempt to march from Selma to Montgomery in 1965, is now
a member of the U.S. Congress.
But at many courthouses throughout the South, very little has changed.
In many courtrooms, things look no different than they did in the 1950s
and before. The prosecutor is white, the judge is white, the defense lawyers are white, and the clerks and court reporters are white. Even in communities with very substantial African American populations, the jury may
be all white because it is still common for black people to be struck from
juries because of their race. But when the defendants are brought in—
when a group of African American men all handcuffed together wearing
orange jumpsuits are brought into the courtroom—it looks like a slave ship
has docked outside the courthouse.
Justice William Brennan described the reality of the impact of race in
our criminal justice system in his dissenting opinion in McCleskey:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked
his lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A
candid reply to this question would have been disturbing. First,
counsel would have to tell McCleskey that few of the details of the
crime or of McCleskey’s past criminal conduct were more important than the fact that his victim was white. Furthermore, counsel
would feel bound to tell McCleskey that defendants charged with
killing white victims in Georgia are 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants charged with killing blacks. In addition, frankness would compel the disclosure that it was more likely
than not that the race of McCleskey’s victim would determine
whether he received a death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants
convicted of killing a white person would not have received the
death penalty if their victims had been black, while, among defendants with aggravating and mitigating factors comparable to
McCleskey’s, 20 of every 34 would not have been sentenced to die
if their victims had been black. Finally, the assessment would not
be complete without the information that cases involving black defendants and white victims are more likely to result in a death sentence than cases featuring any other racial combination of defendant and victim. The story could be told in a variety of ways, but
McCleskey could not fail to grasp its essential narrative line: there
was a significant chance that race would play a prominent role in
determining if he lived or died.47
47. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan ended his opinion by concluding:
The Court’s decision today will not change what attorneys in
Georgia tell other Warren McCleskeys about their chances of execution. Nothing will soften the harsh message they must convey,
nor alter the prospect that race undoubtedly will continue to be a
topic of discussion. McCleskey’s evidence will not have obtained
judicial acceptance, but that will not affect what is said on death
row. However many criticisms of today’s decision may be rendered, these painful conversations will serve as the most eloquent
dissents of all.48
Twenty years later, we still have those conversations with our clients.
We still tell them that race may be more important than anything else in
influencing the outcome of their cases.
There must be a reckoning at some point. If the legislatures and the
courts continue to deny people adequate legal representation, if race continues to be a powerful influence on decisions from police stops for “driving while black” to life and death decisions in capital cases, at some point
we are going to have to sandblast “Equal Justice Under Law” off the Supreme Court building. It is one thing to say we are working towards it, that
it is an aspiration of our legal system, but if our society gives up on it, if
we settle for the very unequal treatment of people in our legal system that
we have now, then that phrase should not be on the Supreme Court building.
Our society is moving in the wrong direction in part because instead of
working to implement a vision of what kind of society we want to have, we
have been reacting out of fear to threats to our way of life. We once had a
President who told us “that the only thing we [had] to fear is fear itself.”49
President Roosevelt’s message was that if the American people did not
panic, if they kept their wits about them and tackled the immense problems
that the country faced in 1933, they would find ways to deal with them and
be successful in doing so. But today, we have a President who tells us to
fear everything: to fear criminals; to fear drugs; to fear same-sex couples;
and, more than anything else, to fear terrorists.
Out of our fear, we have been fighting a war on drugs that has cost us
the protections of the Fourth Amendment and filled prisons at enormous
costs, but done little or nothing to prevent crime or addiction. Out of fear,
we have been fighting a war on crime that—in the popular understanding
48. Id. at 344–45.
49. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS, MARCH 4, 1933, reprinted in
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 269, 269 (1989).
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of things—has relegated the provision of the Bill of Rights to nothing more
than a collection of “technicalities” that get in the way of fighting crime.
And we are in a war on terrorism that we are told justifies all sorts of
things that are contrary to our values: holding people without charges,
without lawyers, and without judicial review; engaging in interrogation
techniques that amount to torture; intercepting people and sending them to
countries that do not respect human rights for interrogation; limiting habeas corpus review even more or denying it altogether; and closing the
courts to the public and the media in some cases for hearings and arguments.50
Whether the government should have suspended some constitutional
protections in the Civil War or World War II is very controversial, but at
least those wars came to an end. The wars against terrorism, crime, and
drugs will never end. There is no likelihood that crime or addiction will be
eliminated from our society or any other. Terrorism is not an enemy, but a
tactic that has been employed throughout history. One or two people can
engage in an act of terrorism, as Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols demonstrated in bombing the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City.
Fighting all of these wars based upon fear and with the notion that we
can suspend the rules in any of them fundamentally changes the kind of
society we have. It is only a matter of time until the thin line between the
war on terror and the war on crime is blurred; until the laws adopted to
fight terrorism are used, for example, against those who are alleged to be
members of gangs in Oakland or Los Angeles. Ultimately, there will be
even fewer constitutional protections for those accused of crimes. The
Constitution—and the willingness of judges to enforce it—provides the
only protections that poor and the powerless people accused of crimes have
from the passions and prejudices of the moment. They have no political
action committees; they have not contributed thousands of dollars to obtain
friends in high places.
Among the many questions before us are whether we will employ torture as a tactic and death as a punishment; whether every person, regardless of race, regardless of wealth or lack of it, and no matter what he or she
is accused of, is entitled to due process when life and liberty are at stake;
whether judges will enforce the Constitution; and whether courts will have
jurisdiction to consider the pleas of those facing a loss of their lives or liberty. Will we answer these questions out of arrogance, vengeance, and fear
or out of humility, understanding, and compassion?
These are questions about what kind of society we will have. The
Constitutional Court of South Africa, in deciding whether post-apartheid
50. See generally COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1.
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South Africa would have the death penalty, concluded that in that society,
which was in transition from hatred to understanding, from vengeance to
reconciliation, there is no place for the death penalty.51
For the time being, America through its elected leaders has demonstrated both arrogance and incompetence in adopting a very harsh and unforgiving approach to these questions. But we have the ability to change
that direction. My hope is that out of humility, respect for the dignity of
every person, compassion, and courage, we will decide that the United
States does not torture people, and that, eventually, we will join the rest of
the world in making permanent, absolute, and unequivocal the injunction
“thou shall not kill.”

51. State v. Makwanyane & Mchunu, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 130–31 (S. Afr.), reprinted in 16
HUM. RTS. L.J. 154, 190 (1995) (Langa, J., concurring).

